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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 890186-CA 
v. : 
STUART D. LUSCHEN, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This an appeal from an Order Denying Motion to Vacate 
Judgment in the Third Judicial District Court. Defendant was 
convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute, a second degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(j) (Supp. 
1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying 
the motion to withdraw the guilty plea after finding that the 
plea was voluntary? 
2. Was defendant denied the effective assistance of 
counsel? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-ll(e)(2) (Supp. 1989): 
The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty or no contest and shall not accept 
such a plea until the court has made the 
findings: . . . (2) That the plea was 
voluntary. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant pled guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, on 
April 11, 1988. This plea was entered in exchange for the State 
dismissing Count II of the information which charged possession 
of a firearm by a restricted person, a third degree felony. 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick sentenced the defendant to the Utah 
State Prison for a term of one to fifteen years and imposed a 
fine of $5,000 plus $1,250 surcharge. 
Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea on December 
14, 1988. Judge Pat B. Brian denied the motion on February 13, 
1989, holding that the plea was voluntary and defendant was not 
coerced by the State. Defendant moved to vacate the order 
denying his motion to withdraw his plea on February 22, 1989. 
Judge Pat B. Brian denied the motion on March 23, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant pled guilty to Count I, possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, in exchange for 
dismissal of Count II, possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person. Defendant's attorney entered into plea negotiations with 
the State after defendant informed him he wanted to plead guilty 
and begin serving his sentence (R. 26). The State agreed to 
dismiss the third degree felony charge in exchange for 
defendant's guilty plea. Defendant's attorney explained the plea 
bargain agreement and the consequences of a guilty plea to 
defendant (R. 27). 
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The trial court asked defendant whether his plea was 
voluntary and if he understood his plea (T. 3-5). Defendant 
replied he was entering his plea voluntarily without any threats 
or promises (T. 3). He stated that he understood the affidavit 
and did not have questions for the court (T. 3). Defendant then 
signed the affidavit and the court accepted his guilty plea (T. 
4, 6). Defendant waived the statutory waiting period for 
sentencing because he wanted to begin serving his sentence (R. 7-
8). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's plea was voluntarily entered as the result 
of plea bargaining. The court questioned defendant about whether 
his plea was voluntary and not coerced. Defendant said it was 
voluntary and no promises were made to him other than those 
outlined in the affidavit. Thus, the court met the Rule 11 
requirement and correctly determined the defendant's plea was 
voluntary. 
Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of 
counsel. His attorney adequately represented defendant's 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 
GUILTY PLEA. 
A court may not accept a plea of guilty unless the 
-plea is voluntarily made.- Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-11(5)(b) 
(Supp. 1989). For a plea to be voluntary, a defendant must have 
"a clear understanding of the charge" and must make the plea 
-without undue influence, coercion, or improper inducement.M 
State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 338-39 (Utah 1977). In addition, 
a defendant "must understand the nature and value of any promises 
made to him." State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1274 (Utah 
1988). Thus, a trial judge should conduct an "on the record 
examination of the defendant" to determine the defendant's 
understanding of the nature of the charge. Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238, 244 n.7 (1969). 
Defendant claims he pled involuntarily because of the 
"State's threat to charge defendant with being a habitual 
criminal" (Br. of App. at 9). He claims he pled guilty "only 
because of the promise not to file the habitual criminal charge" 
(Br. of App. at 6). Defendant maintains he would have "gone to 
trial rather than plead guilty" if he had known the State had no 
grounds to file a habitual criminal charge. (Br. of App. at 3.) 
However, as defendant admits, this allegation is unsupported by 
the record (Br, of App. at 9). 
A defendant is not entitled to withdraw a guilty plea 
as a matter of right. State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
1987). This Court should not interfere with the trial court's 
decision on a motion to withdraw a plea unless the judge clearly 
abused his discretion. State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424 
(Utah 1987). The burden is on the defendant to establish good 
cause for the motion, Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6(2)(a) (Supp. 
1989), and to establish on appeal that the trial court abused its 
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discretion in denying the motion, State v. Larson, 560 P.2d 335, 
336 (Utah 1977). Defendant has failed to carry his burden in 
both instances. 
The record shows defendant voluntarily pled guilty to 
the second degree felony. Frank Mohlman, defendant's attorney, 
stated that defendant admitted he committed the acts and wanted 
to plead guilty prior to any plea bargain discussion (R. 26). 
Mr. Mohlman approached the prosecutor for a plea negotiation (R. 
26). Once the State offered to allow defendant to plead to Count 
I and dismiss Count II, Mr. Mohlman explained the plea bargain to 
defendant and answered defendant's questions (R. 26-27). Mr. 
Mohlman never told defendant he would be convicted of a habitual 
criminal charge (R. 27). Furthermore, Mr. Mohlman thoroughly 
went over the affidavit with defendant and answered all his 
questions concerning the contents of the affidavit. Defendant 
appeared to Mr. Mohlman to have a full understanding of the 
contents and never claimed he was pleading guilty because of any 
threat, coercion, or promise except what was agreed upon and is 
in the affidavit (R. 28). 
The trial judge questioned defendant to determine the 
voluntariness of his plea (T. 5). Defendant stated he understood 
the affidavit, that his plea was voluntary, and that no threats 
or promises were made to him (R. 3, 5). Defendant admitted his 
guilt and stated he was anxious to fulfill his sentence (T. 4, 
8). 
Furthermore, defendant's affidavit stated he was 
entering his guilty plea in exchange for the State dismissing the 
third degree felony charge and that there were M[n]o other 
promises" (R. 8). In Hurst v. Cook/ 113 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 
1989), the defendant claimed he pled guilty to a second degree 
felony but was sentenced for a first degree felony. The court 
upheld the conviction even though the information misnamed the 
offense. Ici. at 7. The court stated that defendant's signed 
plea document, executed on the day defendant pled guilty, 
reflected the nature of the plea negotiation and the information 
indicated the offense was a first degree felony. Id. Thus, the 
defendant's plea was entered with knowledge of its legal 
consequences. Id. 
In this case, defendant also signed an affidavit. This 
affidavit reflected the nature of the plea negotiation and was 
discussed in court. Thus, defendant was aware of the nature of 
the plea bargain and voluntarily entered his guilty plea based on 
the dismissal of the third degree felony. 
Defendant has failed to prove his plea was involuntary. 
He wanted to plead guilty to begin serving his sentence before 
the plea negotiation began. There is nothing in the record 
supporting defendant's claim that he would not have pled guilty 
if he knew the State could not file habitual criminal charges. 
Since there is nothing in the record to support this allegation, 
it should be disregarded. State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1109 
(Utah 1985). 
Defendant also claims the court failed to discover if 
his plea was voluntary because the court did not ask whether the 
affidavit included the entire plea agreement of the parties; 
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thus, his motion to withdraw the plea should have been granted 
(Br. of App. at 10). This argument is without merit because the 
Judge did ask if there were any other promises made to defendant 
that were not in the affidavit (T. 3). 
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1308, 1313 (Utah 1987), 
the court stated that an affidavit may be used to promote 
efficiency, but it is only a starting point for the judge. A 
judge should still question the defendant concerning his 
understanding of the affidavit and review it with the defendant 
to fulfill the Rule 11 requirements. .Id. Recently, however, the 
Court held that an affidavit may be relied on to establish the 
nature of plea negotiations. Hurst, 113 Utah Adv. Rep. at 7. In 
the present case, the trial court relied on an affidavit to 
reflect the nature of the plea negotiation, but, the judge also 
referred to the affidavit on the record and questioned 
defendant's understanding of its contents (T. 2-3). Judge 
Frederick asked defendant whether he had been threatened or 
promised anything other than the promise to dismiss Count II (T. 
3). After defendant denied any threats or promises, he replied 
he was acting of his own free will, and indicated that he 
understood the consequences of the plea, the judge accepted his 
guilty plea (T. 5-6). Thus, the trial court met the requirements 
of Rule 11 and Gibbons on this issue. 
Defendant argues this case as if the prosecutor made a 
promise to defendant and then did not fulfill this promise. See 
App. Br. at 6-7. He also cites the standard for evaluating a 
pre-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea as if it applies to 
this case. See App. Br. at 7 citing State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 
1040 (Utah 1987). Neither of these standards apply here. 
First of all, this was a post-judgment motion to 
withdraw and the liberal standard of Gallegos does not apply. 
The standard of review here is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in finding no good cause and denying defendant's post-
judgment motion to withdraw his plea. See Utah Code Ann. §77-13-
6 (Supp. 1989), and State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Second, the prosecutor made no promise here that he 
failed to fulfill. At worst, perhaps, the prosecutor could be 
accused of having made an illusory promise, i.e. a promise not to 
file a habitual criminal allegation that held no benefit for 
defendant but was made with the illusion of a benefit. See State 
v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1274 (Utah 1988). The record does 
not support, however, a finding that the prosecutor made an 
illusory promise. Mr. Mohlman's affidavit states that the 
possibility of a habitual criminal allegation was discussed and 
that the State was looking into the possibility of such a charge 
(R. 26 at 5). When a plea agreement was reached, however, the 
State simply dropped its investigation into that issue (Ici. ). 
Thus, no promise was made to defendant other than that the State 
would not pursue that avenue. Judge Brian specifically found 
that defendant's plea was not coerced by any threat by the State 
to file a habitual criminal allegation. Findings of Fact 
contained in Order Denying Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, copy 
in Appendix A. This finding is not clearly erroneous based upon 
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the record before Judge Brian. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (1989); 
Jolivet v. Cook, P.2d. , , No. 880341, slip op. at 4 
(Utah Aug. 22, 1989). 
There is no indication in the record whether, in fact, 
such a charge would have been possible other than defendant's 
allegation that it would not. This Court should not speculate as 
to what the State would have found had it continued its 
investigation into the issue. It is clear that Mr. Mohlman 
explained the "nature of an habitual criminal allegation" to 
defendant (R. 26 at 5). Because this plea took place, at 
defendant's request, so soon after Mr. Mohlman began representing 
defendant, it is entirely conceivable that Mr. Mohlman relied on 
defendant's own knowledge of his record to allow defendant to 
make an intelligent decision whether such a charge would be 
possible. Defendant faults Mr. Mohlman for failing to 
investigate his record; nevertheless, defendant was in the best 
position to know whether he had a sufficient record in Utah or 
other states to support the charge. If the State's promise not 
to further investigate the habitual criminal allegation was 
illusory in light of the requirements for such a charge that were 
explained to defendant, it is strange that defendant did not 
point that out to his attorney at the time. 
Significant are defendant's clear desire not to have 
the court obtain a presentence report because it would establish 
that defendant had a prior record, and his desire to proceed 
immediately to sentencing even though counsel advised against it 
(T. 8). Defendant chose to inform the court about some of his 
record that the prosecutor already knew about. These facts 
undermine his claim that the prosecutor made an illusory promise. 
The prosecutor very well may have discovered sufficient previous 
convictions to support a habitual criminal allegation had he 
continued his investigation. There is nothing in the record to 
support defendant's bare allegation that he had no further record 
than he admitted at the time of his plea. Moreover, the "rap" 
sheet included in defendant's brief is not part of the record and 
is not a basis for finding that Judge Brian abused his discretion 
in denying the motion to withdraw the plea. State v. Cook/ 714 
P.2d 296 (Utah 1986) (references to matters outside the record 
are inappropriate and irrelevant and will not be considered). 
Defendant received exactly what he bargained for. The 
State did not further investigate or charge him with habitual 
criminal and it dropped Count II of the information. The fact 
that the plea affidavit did not include a promise that defendant 
actually received should not invalidate defendant's plea. 
Because there is no record supporting defendant's claim that he 
could not have been charged as a habitual criminal, this Court 
should find that the lower court correctly exercised its 
discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
Moving beyond defendant's claim that the prosecutor 
made an illusory promise, the State recognizes that Judge 
Frederick did not fully advise defendant on the record at the 
time of his plea of the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. 
Specifically, he did not advise defendant of his rights against 
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial and to confront 
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the witnesses against him, see Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5)(c) (1989) 
(the 1989 amendment renumbered but did not substantively change 
this provision), nor that the State has the burden to prove the 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, see Rule 
11(5)(d). This Court recently stated in State v. Valencia, 
P.2d , , 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 43 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
that it will consider a Rule 11(5) omission raised for the first 
time on appeal because it is "sufficiently manifest and 
fundamental to be first raised on appeal . . .." In this case, 
defendant has failed to raise the issue even on appeal. For this 
reason, this Court should find that defendant has waived the 
issue. 
In the event that this Court finds the error to be 
sufficiently manifest to consider it sua sponte, the error should 
be reviewed in light of recent developments in the guilty plea 
area. Recent opinions of the Utah Supreme Court clarify State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), as it relates to the "record 
as a whole" standard of review applied in a line of cases 
beginning with Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985). Based 
upon the analysis below, even if this Court reaches the issue, it 
should find that defendant's plea was valid. 
Jolivet v. Cook, P.2d , No. 880341 (Utah Aug. 
22, 1989), finds that although the trial judge did not strictly 
comply with Rule 11 when Jolivet entered his plea, 
'[t]he absence of a finding under [section 
77-35-11] is not critical so long as the 
record as a whole affirmatively establishes 
that the defendant entered his plea with full 
knowledge and understanding of its 
consequences and of the rights he was 
waiving.' State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 
(Utah 1986); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310f 
311 (Utah 1985); Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 
309, 310 (Utah 1985). 
Slip op. at 3-4. Interestingly, Judge Billings of this Court sat 
in place of Justice Stewart in Jolivet. Decided prior to 
Jolivet, State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), also 
applies the record as a whole test. The Copeland court said: 
The United States Supreme Court has said, 
M[T]here is no adequate substitute for 
demonstrating in the record at the time the 
plea is entered the defendant's understanding 
of the nature of the charge against him." 
McCarthy fv. United States], 394 U.S. [459,] 
470 . . . (emphasis in the original). We 
think the most effective way to do this is to 
have a defendant state in his own words his 
understanding of the offense and the actions 
which make him guilty of the offense. By 
this statement, the trial court can assure 
itself that the defendant is truly submitting 
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the 
record on appeal will clearly reflect the 
defendant's understanding. Although this 
method is therefore preferable to others, it 
is not absolutely required. The test is 
voluntariness. 
765 P.2d at 1273 (footnote omitted). These cases make it clear 
that the test is whether the record as a whole establishes that 
the plea is voluntary, knowing and intelligent. This Court's 
holdings in Valencia, and State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), that "[sjtrict, and not just substantial, 
compliance with the rule [that the examination must be by the 
court on the record at the time of the plea] is required," 
Valencia, slip op. at 3, are inconsistent with recent Utah 
Supreme Court rulings and should not be followed. 
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Furthermore, this Mstrict compliance" test is also 
inconsistent with Gibbons and other case law previously decided 
by the Supreme Court. A close reading of Gibbons reveals that 
the Court was simply pointing out the much preferred and safest 
method of determining the voluntariness of a plea. The Supreme 
Court had before it in Gibbons a transcript of the plea hearing, 
740 P.2d at 1310-11. Since the Court was able to review the 
transcript and determined that the examination of the defendant 
was inadequate, it seems likely that they would have remanded the 
case with an order that the plea be withdrawn rather than 
remanding for a hearing on the issue of voluntariness if they 
intended to impose a rule of strict Rule 11 compliance. This 
viewpoint is reinforced by Copeland's clear statement that strict 
Rule 11 compliance is not absolutely required when a guilty plea 
is otherwise voluntary. 
The State agrees that it is much preferred to have all 
of these findings on the record at the plea hearing. In some 
cases, however, judges have overlooked certain aspects of Rule 11 
at the time of the plea. Where there is a record that 
establishes that the defendant pled voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently, it seems unnecessary to invalidate a plea simply 
because the judge overlooked parts of the Rule 11 examination in 
court. 
For example, in State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 
1986), the Court held that violations of Rule 11 do not 
automatically invalidate an otherwise voluntary plea. The Court 
stated: 
A final word on the State's Rule 11 
arguments. In its zeal to set aside Kay's 
guilty pleas or renege on the bargain that 
was struck, the State has argued, in effect, 
that otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty 
pleas should always be voided when the trial 
court violates any provision of Rule 11. The 
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Hall and 
Justice Howe adopt this reasoning as well. 
This position is short-sighted, for to follow 
it would be to sanction a remedy far worse 
than the wrong. If we were to hold that any 
violation of Rule 11 automatically voids the 
resultant plea, even when the plea is 
knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would 
encourage defendants, convicted and sentenced 
after such a plea to attack their convictions 
for purely tactical reasons, either by direct 
appeal or by seeking habeas corpus long after 
the fact. We have refused to overturn 
convictions upon such challenges in the past 
and we find no reason to encourage such 
attacks in the future. 
Overturning such convictions—which we 
would have to do if we embraced the rationale 
advanced by the State and the Chief Justice's 
concurring opinion—would require the State 
to reprosecute numerous defendants, probably 
long after the challenged guilty pleas were 
entered and when the passage of time would 
make reprosecution impractical, if not 
impossible. Almost certainly, the ultimate 
result would be to free a number of convicted 
persons for nothing more than technical 
errors in the acceptance of their voluntary 
guilty pleas. 
Kay, 717 P.2d at 1301-02 (footnote and citations omitted). 
Importantly, Gibbons did not overrule Kay. Nor did it even cite 
to Kay, Miller, Brooks or Warner. Given the Utah Supreme Court's 
recent reliance on the Miller, Brooks and Warner line of cases, 
it does not appear that it was mere oversight that the Court did 
not overrule these cases. Instead, it appears that the record as 
a whole test remains viable even after Gibbons. 
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It may be argued that Copeland and Jolivet represent 
cases where the Supreme Court was applying the record as a whole 
test only because the pleas were entered before Gibbons was 
decided. This argument gains some support from the Court's 
recent refusal to apply Gibbons to a pre-Gibbons plea on the 
theory that the Gibbons decision was a clear break with the past 
and consequently not retroactive. See State v. Hickmany P.2d 
, , No. 880305, slip op. at 3, n. 1 (Utah Aug. 17, 1989). 
Hickman, although troublesome, is not controlling when 
closely analyzed. First, it is a per curiam decision. Second, 
it ignores that the Court applied the record as a whole test in 
Jolivet after stating the Gibbons requirements but without 
distinguishing the case on the basis that it was a pre-Gibbons 
plea. The Court did not even cite Gibbons in Copeland, thus, 
indicating no concern that Gibbons was inconsistent with its 
holding. Notably, the Court does not even state the date of 
Jolivet's plea and mentions only in passing the date of 
Copeland's plea without assigning any particular significance to 
the date. The Court's willingness to apply the record as a whole 
test in these two cases without explaining that there was any 
reason other than that it is the test to be applied indicates 
that the Court believes just that—that the test is 
voluntariness, not strict compliance with rigid Rule 11 
recitations. Were it otherwise, it is likely that the Court 
would have overruled Miller, Kay, Brooks, and Warner; or at least 
have expressly limited their application to pre-Gibbons cases. 
The Court simply has done neither and this Court should 
reconsider its rigid application of a strict Rule 11 compliance 
standard with this line of cases in mind. 
Evaluating this case under the record as a whole test, 
this Court can find that defendant was advised of his 
constitutional rights as Judge Brian found. See Findings of 
Fact, contained in Order Denying Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 
copy in Appendix A. In the affidavit, which Judge Frederick 
referred to in open court, defendant was fully advised of the 
constitutional rights that he was waiving (R. 6-7). Judge 
Frederick did not stop with asking defense counsel whether 
defendant understood the affidavit (T. 2-3). He also 
specifically asked defendant if he understood the affidavit and 
whether he had any questions about it (T. 3). These references, 
along with defendant's signature on the affidavit, establish that 
defendant was adequately advised of the rights he was waiving. 
Even though Gibbons instructs that trial courts should 
not rely on defense attorneys to explain a defendant's rights to 
him, this instruction was based upon the fear that defendants 
simply come into court and do whatever their attorneys tell them 
to do. See, e.g., 740 P.2d at 1313. In this case, however, 
defendant did not simply stand mute and do what his attorney told 
him to do without asking other questions of the court. When 
Judge Frederick was explaining that he was amending the affidavit 
to reflect the actual charge to which defendant was pleading 
guilty, defendant initially indicated that he did not understand 
what Judge Frederick was doing (T. 5). The Judge explained 
himself further and defendant then indicated understanding. If 
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defendant did not understand other parts of the affidavit, it 
seems likely that he would have said so when asked. Since he 
said he understood it, this Court should find that it was 
sufficient to advise defendant of the rights he was waiving by 
pleading guilty. 
Furthermore, the record indicates that defendant was 
not new to the criminal justice system. He had been previously 
convicted of burglary in Utah and had other charges pending in 
other states at the time of his plea (T. 9). From defendant's 
pro se pleadings, it appears that he has a good command of the 
English language and could have understood what he was reading in 
the affidavit. See R. 13-21, 23-4, 43-8, 54-62, 68-72. Judge 
Brian was not required to believe defendant's later claims that 
he did not understand the affidavit when he stated on the record 
at the time of the plea that he did understand it and, therefore, 
Judge Brian's ruling was not clearly erroneous. Jolivet v. Cook, 
No. 880341, slip op. at 4 (Utah Aug. 22, 1989). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL 
A defendant is guaranteed the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel. State v. Crestani# 771 P.2d 1085, 1089 
(Utah App. 1989). To substantiate a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that "counsel's 
performance was deficient [and] that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense." State v. Grueberf 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 
29, 33 (Utah App. 1989). To establish prejudice a defendant must 
show that a "reasonable probability exists that, but for 
counsel's error, the result would have been different." Ld. If 
both tests are not proven, "then defendant's ineffectiveness 
claim is defeated." Id. 
Defendant claims Mr. Mohlman was ineffective because he 
did not explain to him that the State could not file a habitual 
criminal charge. However, Mr. Mohlman did not investigate this 
because it was not a part of the plea bargain. 
Defendant indicated to Mr. Mohlman that he wanted to 
plead guilty before the State offered its plea bargain (R. 26). 
Mr. Mohlman then entered into plea negotiations with the State 
(R. 26). Mr. Mohlman discussed the negotiations with defendant, 
explained the nature of the habitual criminal allegations, and 
answered his questions (R. 26-27). Furthermore, Mr. Mohlman 
examined the State's evidence and determined that sufficient 
evidence existed so as to allow a jury to find the defendant 
guilty of both charges in the information (R. 27). Mr. Mohlman 
then discussed the evidence with defendant and gave him a 
professional assessment of the evidence (R. 27). Also, Mr. 
Mohlman explained the affidavit and the plea bargain agreement 
with defendant (T. 2; R. 28). Thus, Mr. Mohlman represented 
defendant's interests in court and in the plea negotiations. 
Furthermore, Mr. Mohlman counseled defendant and provided him 
with legal advice. Advising someone to plead guilty to a crime 
to which they admit guilt is not the basiis for an assertion of 
deficient performance. Mr. Mohlman provided adequate 
representation and, therefore, the first test is not met. 
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In addition, defendant was not prejudiced by Mr. 
Mohlman's failure to inquire into the grounds for filing an 
habitual criminal charge. Defendant received a more lenient 
sentence than he would otherwise have received because the third 
degree felony charge was dismissed. If this case were remanded 
back to the lower court, that charge would be reinstated and 
defendant would be subject to the possibility of a greater 
sentence. Thus, defendant benefitted from the plea bargain Mr. 
Mohlman negotiated. He also benefitted because, as noted above, 
the State did not further investigate the possibility of the 
habitual criminal charge. The record does not disclose whether 
the State would have found support for the charge had it 
continued to investigate. Defendant did admit that he had a 
prior record and specifically declined a presentence report. Mr. 
Mohlman would have been justified in concluding that defendant 
felt the possibility of being adjudged an habitual criminal was 
real given that Mr. Mohlman did explain the nature of the 
allegation to defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this £/&f~ day of August, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney GeneraJ 
//SANDRA L. _ 
«-^ Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Alan K. Jeppesen, attorney for defendant, 85 North Main 
Street, Tooele, Utah 84074 this jj&f day of August, 1989. 
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APPENDIX A 
MARK W. NASH #2365 ' l ' "' 
Deputy Tooele County Attorney 
Tooele County Courthouse 
47 South Main Street 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
Telephone: 882-5550, Ext. 351 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT I 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) ORDER DENYING MOTION TO I 
Plaintiff, ) WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA 
Vs. ) I 
STUART DEAN LUSCHEN, ) Case No. CR88-020 
Defendant. ) 
T* F^ F^ F^ ^h F^ F^ F^ I 
This matter came on before the above-named court on the 13th day of February] 
1989, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding. The matter came before the Court on Defendant's 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and upon Defendant's Notice of Hearing which noticed thd 
Motion For Hearing before the above-named court on February 13, 1989, at 10 a.mJ 
Defendant was not personally present before the Court, he having failed to obtain an Ordeij 
of Transportation from the District Court directing that he be transported to the heamg by thd 
Department of Corrections. The State was represented by Mark W. Nash, Depaty Tooeld 
County Attorney. 
t< 
The Court called the matter and Mr. Nash entered his appearance. Afteit 
ascertaining that Defendant was not present, the Coun inquired of Mr. Nash as 10 how the 
State desired to proceed. Mr. Nash responded that unless the Coun desired tc hear oral 
arguments and receive testimony, the State was willing to submit the matter based upon the 
memoranda and documents submitted by the parties. The Court thereupon made the following 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered the following order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Coun, having reviewed the documents on file including the Guilty Plea 
Affidavit of Defendant dated April 11, 1988, the transcript of the arraignment and sentencing 
of Mr. Luschen which took place on April 11, 1988, the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and 
Memorandum in support thereof filed by Defendant and the Memorandum in Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea together with the Affidavit of Frank Mohlman 
filed in support thereof by the State, as well as all other relevant documents, finds: j 
1. That Defendant's entry of a guilty plea to the charge of "Possession ot 
a Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute" on April 11, 1988, was done voluntarily and 
with a full understanding of the following: 
a. The elements of the offense to which Defendant plead guilty: and 
b. The minimum and maximum sentences that could have been 
imposed for the offense to which Defendant plead guilty, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutively sentences; and 
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c. That any recommendation as to the sentencing from any person, 
including the prosecutor, is not binding upon the Coun: and 
d. That by pleading guilty, the Defendant waived the following 
constitutional rights: 
i. The right to testify in his own behalf; and 
ii. The right agains; compulsory self-incrimination; and 
hi. The righ; to confront and cross-examine the witnesses 
against him: and 
iv. The right to a speedy, public trial by an impariial jury of 
the County or District in which the offense was alleged to have 
been committed; and 
v. The right to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf; and 
vi. The right to appeal. 
2. The Coun further finds that Defendant's plea of guilty was rot coerced 
by any part} nor was that plea of guilty entered in response to any promises or threats made 
to or against Defendant by any party except by the promise of the State to move for dismissal 
of Count II of the Information then pending against Defendant (Possession of a Firearm by 
a Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony) in return for Defendant's plea of guilty to Count 
I of the Informadon. The Coun specifically finds that Defendant's plea of guiliy was not 
coerced by any threat of the State to file habitual criminal charges against Defencant should 
3 
he fail to plead guilty. The Court further finds that Defendant fully understood the details of 
the plea agreement entered into and that the State complied with the promises it h*.d made as 
pan of the plea negotiations. The Court also finds that there was a factual basis fcr the entry 
of the guilty plea and that the Defendant was competent to enter that guilty plea. 
3. The Court further finds that Defendant was informed that his case could 
be referred to the Department of Adult Probation and Parole for the preparation of a 
presentence report should Defendant so request. The Court finds that Defendant voluntarily 
and knowingly waived the preparation of such a report despite having been adv sed to the 
concrary by his attorney. The Court further finds that Defendant voluntarily waived the 
minimum time in which to be sentenced and asked to be sentenced immediately following his 
en.,7 of guilty plea. 
4. The Court further finds that Defendant was represented by competent 
counsel during the entire arraignment and sentencing process and that the advice and 
representations given to Defendant by his attorney were appropriate and accurate. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing findings, the Court concludes that all applicable rules 
and case law were complied with by the Court in the receipt and acceptance of Defendant^ 
pica of guilty and in the sentencing of Defendant on April 11, 1988. The Ccurt further 
concludes that Defendant, by his knowing, intelligent and voluntary entry of a plea of guilty, 
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waived any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence against him and that he may not now 
raise such issues. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Court 
hereby orders Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea denied. The Judgment and 
Sentence entered by Judge Dennis Frederick on April 11, 1988, shall remain in ful force and 
affect and Defendant shall remain in the custody of the Department of Correctiors pursuant 
to the provisions of that Judgment and Sentence. 
DATED this / ? day of f *&At> *s»<^ , (.989. 
.^  r^.^ L / ^7W/^^ 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Denying 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea to Stuart Dean Luschen, Box 250, Draper, U:ah 84020, 
postage prepaid, this I h day of F^U^Z^ 1989. 
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